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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from its decision in Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181, reh'g denied 
(May 25, 2006), Addendum A. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standards for reviewing 
allegations of a violation of rule 11 violation raised for the first time in a habeas petition. 
V 
Issue 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in its evaluation of the interests-of-justice 
exception to the one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions. 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals opinion under review is Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, 
134 P.3d 181, reWg denied (May 25, 2006). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-102 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-104 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-35a-107 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 
VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On October 4, 2001, Respondent Tammy Bluemel ("Ms. Bluemel"), was charged 
with seven counts of Rape, a First Degree Felony, and one count of Supplying Alcohol to 
a Minor, a Class A Misdemeanor. (Criminal Case No. 011404069, hereinafter "Crim. 
R."). She was represented at the trial by Victor Lawrence. (Crim R. 9, 20). Mr. 
Lawrence has never withdrawn from representing Ms. Bluemel. On December 5, 2001, 
Ms. Bluemel entered guilty pleas to three counts of rape, and one count of supplying 
alcohol to a minor, while the remaining four counts of rape were dismissed. (Crim. R. 
29-31). She was sentenced on March 27, 2002, and received three indeterminate terms of 
not less than five years and which may be life, and one indeterminate term not to exceed 
one year, all to be run concurrently. (Crim R. 44-45). Ms. BluemePs counsel did not file 
a notice of appeal nor did he file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Supporting 
Memorandum, alleging that she entered an involuntary and unknowing plea, and received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, though she requested he do so. (Civil Case No. 
040401880, hereinafter "Civil R."). Upon request for decision from Ms. Bluemel, the 
trial court reviewed the petition and found that it merited a response from the 
government. The trial court thus ordered a copy of the petition served upon the Attorney 
General. (Civil R. 23). The government filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, and 
supporting memorandum on November 4, 2004. (Civil R. 35-86). Ms. Bluemel then 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 31, 2005. (Civil 
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R. 116-126). The government filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and the trial court 
issued a decision granting the government's Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely, 
finding no claim warranted a waiving of the untimely filing. (Civil R. 131-133). Ms. 
Bluemel appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the court's dismissal. Bluemel v. 
State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181, reh 'g denied (May 25, 2006). The State of Utah 
filed a Petition for Rehearing on April 28, 2006, but that petition was denied. On June 
27, 2006, the State of Utah filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted on 
September 15,2006. 
Statement of Facts 
On October 4, 2001, Ms. Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape and one 
count of supplying alcohol to a minor. (Crim. R. 4). On October 24, 2001, attorney 
Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence" or "trial counsel") entered an appearance on behalf of 
Ms. Bluemel. (Crim. R. 20). On December 5, 2001 Ms. Bluemel entered guilty pleas to 
three counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor, while the four other 
counts of rape were dismissed. (Crim. R. 22-29). When Ms. Bluemel entered her pleas, 
she was under the influence of eight prescription drugs: 
• 600 mg of Neurotin three times daily (1800 mg per day) 
• 150 mg of Effexor twice daily (300 mg per day) 
• 5 mg Xanax daily 
• 50 mg Trazadone daily 
• 700 mg of Soma four times daily (2800 mg daily) 
• 800 mg of Ibuprofen three times daily (2400 mg daily) 
• Macrodantin; and 
• Axid 
(Civil R. 121). 
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Prior to accepting her pleas, the trial court informed Ms. Bluemel of the maximum 
possible punishments, most of the rights which she was waiving by entering a guilty plea, 
and that she would have thirty days in which to move to withdraw her plea. (Crim. R. 
57:2-4). Significantly, the trial court judge did not inquire as to whether she was under 
the influence of any drugs or alcohol, nor as to whether she was knowingly and 
voluntarily entering her pleas. (Crim. R. 57). She was also not informed by the trial 
court the she was presumed innocent, could compel witnesses to testify on her behalf, or 
that her right of appeal was limited. (Crim. R. 57). The trial court asked for the factual 
basis of the plea, and the terms of the plea agreement. (Crim. R. 57:2, 4). Ms. Bluemel. 
then entered her pleas, which the trial court accepted as knowing and voluntary. (Crim. 
R. 57:4-5). Ms. Bluemel was sentenced on March 27, 2002, and received three 
indeterminate terms of not less than five years and which may be life, and one 
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all to be run concurrently. (Crim. R. 44-45). 
She was taken into custody at that time and remains at the Utah State Prison. (Crim. R. 
44). 
Immediately following her sentencing, Ms. Bluemel told Mr. Lawrence that she 
wanted to appeal. (Civil R. 113). He advised her that he would handle the appeal and 
that she had one year in which to file an appeal. (Civil R. 113). During Ms. BluemePs 
first year in prison, Mr. Lawrence visited Ms. Bluemel approximately three times, 
although not during her first thirty days in prison, and each time informed her that he was 
working on her appeal. (Civil R. 113). Ms. Bluemel continued to write to and call Mr. 
Lawrence, however his office eventually refused her calls and would not respond to her 
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letters. (Civil R. 112-113). After one year, Ms. Bluemel stopped trying to contact her 
attorney, and began seeking new counsel. (Civil R. 113). Ms. Bluemel hired current 
defense counsel in October of 2003 to research her options. After meeting with Ms. 
Bluemel, reviewing the evidence, and researching the law, defense counsel filed a 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief on May 3, 2004. (Civil R. 17, 19, 112, 124). The 
government moved to Dismiss the Petition, and after a response from Ms. Bluemel, the 
trial court granted the government's Motion to Dismiss, finding that there were 
insufficient interests of justice such to waive the untimely filing of the Petition. (Civil R. 
36-38, 99-126, 130-133). Ms. Bluemel, through counsel, appealed and the Court of 
Appeals reversed. State v. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141,115-17, 134 P.3d 181. The State 
petitioned for a rehearing and that petition was denied on May 25, 2006. The State 
petitioned for writ of certiorari, and that writ was granted on September 15, 2006. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the interests of justice warrant 
waiving the untimely filing of Respondent's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief The 
violations of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exceeded simple, 
harmless, technical violations, and rose to noncompliance with the constitutional 
requirements of Rule 11. This noncompliance caused Respondent's plea to be 
unknowing and involuntary. Where Ms. Bluemel did not enter an knowing and voluntary 
plea and did not receive effective assistance of counsel throughout and following the trial 
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court proceedings, the interests of justice require waiving the one year time period, and 
warrant post conviction relief for Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
WHERE RULE 11 VIOLATIONS RENDERED THE PLEA 
UNKNOWING AND INVOLUNTARY. 
A plea is unconstitutional where it was unknowing and involuntary as a result of 
the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her constitutional rights on the record. 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). The Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth rules governing pleas in order 
to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and voluntarily waives the 
protections the constitution guarantees him prior to a trial verdict. State v. Corwell, 2005 
UT 28, ^[11,114 P.3d 569. Where the plea is not knowing and voluntary, it violates the 
defendant's due process rights under the Constitution. State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, 
T| 22, 69 P.3d 838. If a defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading 
guilty, the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. Id. Where a plea is not voluntary, a court's 
acceptance of that plea is unjust. Id. 
The burden of ensuring strict compliance with the rules governing taking of pleas 
rests on the trial court. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987) appeal 
after remand on other grounds, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1987). The trial court must 
establish on the record that the plea is knowing and voluntary. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 
88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242. If a written plea statement is used to demonstrate compliance 
with the rules governing pleas, the plea statement must be properly incorporated in the 
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record. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991), reversed on other grounds, 957 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). Proper incorporation includes an inquiry as to whether or not the 
defendant has, in fact, read and understood the statement, a requirement that is not 
satisfied by asking if the defendant has any questions. Id. Where the court does not 
establish that the defendant has read and understands the written plea statement, that 
statement does not become part of the record. Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at j^ 22, 69 P.3d 
838. 
On appeal the court is entitled to examine the entire record, but facts not contained 
in the record may not be considered. Utah R. of App. P. 11. It follows that where the 
written plea statement was not incorporated into the record, it may not be reviewed to 
determine whether or not the plea was knowing and voluntary. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, 
If 20, 69 P.3d 838. In this case the trial court did not "strictly comply" with Rule 11 by 
failing to notify the defendant, on the record, of several of the important fundamental 
rights she was waiving. State v. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, % 15-17, 134 P.3d 181. 
A. Where The Court Failed To Strictly Comply With Rule 11, As 
Opposed To Committing A Technical Violation, The Plea Is 
Unknowing And Involuntary. 
A court must strictly comply with Rule 11 because Rule 11 is a constitutionally 
based rule, crafted to ensure compliance with requirements of due process. Stilling, 856 
P.2d at 671. Strict compliance can be accomplished even if the court commits a 
"technical violation" of the rule. Compare United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 
(1979) (A technical violation does not indicate a constitutionally infirm plea) with 
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Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at^ f 11, 114 P.3d 569. Rule 11 is not meant to create a rote script 
the court must read through at the time of sentencing. Utah R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory 
Committee Note. Courts are permitted to convey the rights a defendant waives when she 
pleads guilty in whatever way they see fit. Id. Though no script is required, the court 
must demonstrate that a defendant knowingly waives each of the rights on the record. 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). The record may include a written 
statement in advance of the plea if and only if the trial court properly incorporates such a 
statement into the record. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217. 
A trial judge should refuse to accept a plea until the court has found that the 
defendant knows of certain rights, including the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by pleading guilty the defendant's right to 
appeal is limited. Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at If 11, 114 P.3d 569.. The defendant must also 
understand the minimum and maximum sentences. Id. The requirement that a court must 
"strictly comply" with Rule 11 means a defendant must state, on the record, that she 
understands and waives each of these rights. Where a court fails to strictly comply with 
Rule 11, the plea is unknowing and therefore involuntary. Id. (citing Visser, 2000 UT 88 
at 1f 11, 22 P.3d 1242); State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 at f 11, 996 P.2d 1065 (Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel embodied in Rule 11); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (Utah 
1987) (requirement protects a defendant's right to due process); Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671 
("the procedural rules are meant, to some extent at least, to incorporate constitutional 
protections")(citing United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) and Salazar 
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v. Warden 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)). Compliance with Rule 11(e) creates a 
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11, 1 
P.3d 1108. 
Courts are not required to follow a rote script to ensure strict compliance, but the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals calls any occasion where a court does not precisely 
state every right that is waived exactly as stated in Rule 11a "technical violation." See 
e.g. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992; State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, If 12, 57 P.3d 1106, 
rev'd, 2004 UT 63, If 23, 95 P.3d 276. Technical violations are not constitutional 
violations, and do not affect the validity of pleas. Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Because of 
the words used in current Rule 11 jurisprudence, a court can commit "technical 
violations" and still strictly comply with Rule 11 and constitutional due process. Id. 
Petitioner argues that the violations here fall into the category of "technical 
violations" because "[Ms. Bluemel] never claimed she would not have pleaded guilty if 
she had been apprised of those rights." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 17). This further 
demonstrates the lack of clarity concerning a technical violation as opposed to 
noncompliance, and the lack of clarity surrounding the term "technical violation." 
Failure to strictly comply means a trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 to the extent 
that the record lacks sufficient evidence to show that the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived her rights. State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, f 16-17, 73 P.3d 985. 
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 rendered Ms. Bluemel's plea unknowing 
and involuntary, and violated her constitutional rights. 
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Petitioner next argues that a defendant is permitted to withdraw her plea only for 
"good cause" when she does so on direct appeal. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 10). This 
argument is incorrect because it presupposes that all Rule 11 violations are technical and 
that a Rule 11 violation would never be "good cause." While it is certainly true that more 
than a technical violation is required to withdraw a plea post conviction, that burden is 
met where a Rule 11 violation renders a plea unknowing and involuntary. 
Petitioner points out that on a motion for post conviction relief, a petitioner must 
show that the plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 10). 
Petitioner's rule is incorrect. The trial court bears the burden of ensuring that both 
constitutional and Rule 11 requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. On a motion for post conviction relief, a petitioner must 
show that the record is insufficient to support that the plea was knowing and voluntary, 
which is quite different from proving that the plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary. 
Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at Tf 18. As the Court of Appeals stated in Bluemel, the record 
is insufficient to support such a conclusion. 2006 UT App 141 at ^  15-17, 134 P.3d 181. 
Petitioner also points out that the scope of Rule 11 differs from the scope of the 
constitutional rules upon which Rule 11 is based. It is correct that Rule 11 is slightly 
broader than the constitutional requirements, which explains why courts may commit a 
"technical violation" without committing a constitutional violation. From this rule it 
follows that where a court violates Rule 11 and that violation is more than "technical," 
the violation is a constitutional violation rendering the plea constitutionally infirm. In 
effect, Petitioner either misunderstands the technical-strict compliance dichotomy, or he 
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is arguing that because some Rule 11 violations are not constitutional violations, no Rule 
11 violations are constitutional. A comparison of the cases cited by Petitioner reveals 
that the Rule 11 violation here is beyond technical and should be treated as a 
constitutional violation. The Rule 11 violations in this case are beyond technical, and 
cause the guilty plea to be constitutionally infirm. 
B. Bluemel Does Not Conflict With Cases From Other Jurisdictions. 
Petitioner cites to a series of cases that are allegedly inconsistent with Bluemel 
because they hold that particular Rule 11 violations are insufficient to support a claim of 
a constitutional violation. (Peitioner's Brief, p.l 1-13). As stated above, a technical 
violation of Rule 11 is not sufficient to support post conviction relief. No case cited on 
page 11-13 of Petitioner's brief conflicts with Bluemel Each case where a Rule 11 
violation does not rise to a constitutional violation is a mere technical violation. On the 
other hand, each case that is similar to this case is a failure to strictly comply and is a 
constitutional violation. 
In the first of these cases, United States v. Timmreck, a defendant claimed that the 
plea process violated Rule 11 where the trial court did not tell the defendant of a 
mandatory parole term. 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). The court did inform the defendant of 
the minimum and maximum terms of his sentence, as required by the Constitution and 
Rule 11, and the prison term plus the parole term fell within those parameters. Id. 
Though the court called this a technical violation, they did not point to any particular 
clause of federal Rule 11 that was not fulfilled. Id. There was not even a "technical 
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violation" in Timmreck. Since the defendant did not claim that the alleged Rule 11 
violation rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court held that such a 
violation could not be raised on a petition for post conviction relief. This is different 
from the present case because the Rule 11 violation resulted in a record inadequate to 
support a finding that the plea was knowing and voluntary. 
Petitioner next cites to U.S. v. Grewal, another case where the record does contain 
adequate factual basis to determine that the Petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary. 
825 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1987). In that case, Petitioner alleged that his conviction was 
unconstitutional because the trial court did not tell him the maximum range of his 
sentence, or that his sentence could include restitution. Id. at 222. While the maximum 
sentence was not communicated in the colloquy or in a written plea statement, the 
maximum sentence was incorporated into the record by way of a presentence report. Id. 
Mr. Grewal stated on the record that he read and understood the presentence report. Id. 
Accordingly, the record in that case complied with Rule 11 and the Constitution. The 
record in this case does not establish whether Ms. Bluemel knew or understood several 
important constitutional rights, or knew that her plea constituted an admission of all the 
facts required for the conviction. Her plea statement was not incorporated into the 
record. 
People v. Holvey, a thirty-two year old Illinois case, is also distinguishable from 
Bluemel 308 N.E.2d 622 (111. App. 1974). In that case, the trial court failed to establish 
on the record the factual basis for the guilty plea. The trial court established the basis for 
the plea as follows: 
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The Court: Are you, Mr. Holvey, pleading guilty because you believe to be guilty 
in fact? 
Defendant: Yes, sir. 
The Court: Do you believe yourself in fact guilty or are you merely pleading guilty 
because somebody has advised you to do so? 
Defendant: I know I am guilty sir. 
Id. at 623. In clarifying its state rule, the Illinois Appeals Court looked to the similarly 
worded federal Rule 11. In denying the motion to withdraw, the court found it important 
that there was no claim the record was insufficient to support the conviction, but Mr. 
Hovley merely claimed a Rule 11 violation. 
Petitioner next cites to Powers v. State, which involves a similar claim where the 
factual basis for the plea was not sufficiently stated on the record, but Rule 11 was 
otherwise satisfied. 942 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The Tennessee court found 
it highly significant that defendants may strategically choose to avoid going into great 
detail when establishing the factual basis for the plea. Id. Where a defendant stated as 
little as possible for the factual basis for his guilty plea, and petitioned to withdraw the 
plea on that same basis, courts should deny such petitions. Such defendants "at best, 
invited error." Id. at 555. 
Furthermore, Rule ll(e)(4)(A-B) of the Utah rules explains the factual basis 
requirement for a plea, and is totally consistent with Bluemel, Powers, and Holvey. 
While the defendant must understand the rights he waives, the factual basis requirement 
is met if the factual basis: 
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"[Establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction." 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11(e)(4)(B). North Carolina v. AIford clearly demonstrates that a 
defendant need not state the factual basis for the guilty plea OQ the record in order for the 
plea agreement to be constitutional. 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (Defendant can maintain 
innocence and plead guilty in order to obtain favorable plea agreement). Thus, a plea 
where a defendant is not informed of her rights is very different from a plea where a 
defendant understands his rights, but strategically chooses to state as little a basis for the 
plea as he can. While Powers and Holvey may still be valid law, they do not conflict 
with Bluemel and cannot be relied on in this case. Even so, Holvey directly conflicts with 
governing law in this jurisdiction. Holvey states that "substantial compliance" with Rule 
11 is sufficient, while this jurisdiction requires strict compliance. 308N.E.2d at 624, 
compare Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at ^ 11, 114 P.3d 569 (Substantial compliance with Rule 
11 is insufficient); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (Same). 
None of the cases Petitioner cites from other jurisdictions conflict with Bluemel. 
C. Bluemel Dots Not Conflict With Prior Court Of Appeals' Opinions. 
Petitioner next cites several Court of Appeals opinions for the proposition that 
Bluemel is a significant break from prior decisions by the Court of Appeals. A careful 
look at these cases demonstrates that Bluemel does not conflict with any of these cases. 
The first case is Moench v. State. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 12). Beyond not supporting 
Petitioner's position, Moench is quite contrary to it. In that case, the Court of appeals 
held: 
"While it is the responsibility of the trial judge to establish that strict compliance 
with Rule 11 is established, strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple 
means so long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record 
reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled" 
Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, f 17, 88 P.3d 353. In Moench the petitioner was 
denied relief, but the Court of Appeals stated that relief was denied because the petitioner 
was informed of each of his rights he was waiving under Rule 11. The trial court is not 
required to tell the defendant of collateral consequences of his guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(8). It would follow the above excerpt in Moench that where a requirement of the 
rule is omitted, and the record does not reflect that the requirement has been fulfilled, the 
trial judge failed to established strict compliance, which is constitutional compliance. 
Petitioner next references State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App. 212, 73 P.3d 985. Both the 
holding and the result of State v. Lehi are contrary to Petitioner's position. In that case, 
the defendant, Mr. Lehi, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence with two prior 
convictions in exchange for dismissal of other charges and a ninety-day sentence 
recommendation. Id. at f 4. No blood or breath alcohol test was administered because 
Mr. Lehi refused, but several witnesses at a preliminary hearing testified that Mr. Lehi 
was impaired. At his plea colloquy the court properly incorporated the plea affidavit into 
the record, but neither the affidavit nor the colloquy made reference to the preliminary 
hearing. After pleading guilty, the judge departed from the sentencing recommendation. 
The petitioner attempted to withdraw his plea, but the judge denied that request. 
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The Lehi court quoted McCarthy v. United States to emphasize "there is no 
adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered Hat 
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him." 349 U.S. 459, 470 
(1969) (emphasis in original). An inconsistency between the information and the plea 
affidavit showed that Mr. Lehi did not fully understand his rights. Though mentioned, 
the record from the preliminary hearing was not properly incorporated and could not be 
used to clarify certain ambiguities. The Court of Appeals stated: 
"We acknowledge it is quite possible that on a purely subjective level, Defendant 
actually did understand the nature and elements of the DUI charge. However, 
since such an understanding is not evidenced from the plea record before us, we 
cannot conclude that the trial court adequately ensured that Defendant understood 
the charge." 
LehU 2003 UT App 212 at If 14, n.5, 73 P.3d 985. As the record in Lehi did not contain 
the facts as gathered at the preliminary hearing, the record in this case does not include 
the written plea affidavit. Upon examining the entire record, nothing suggests that Ms. 
Bluemel understood her right to presumption of innocence, the State's burden, her right 
to compel witnesses, or that a plea is an admission of all the facts. Bluemel, 2006 UT 
App 141 at % 16, 134 P.3d 181. Where the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 
makes it impossible to conclusively determine whether or not defendant's plea was 
knowing and voluntary, the Rule 11 violation is a constitutional violation and the 
interests of justice require that she be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Id. 
Peguero v. United States does not conflict with Bluemel either. (Petitioner's Brief 
p. 16-17). In that case, the trial court's failure to inform a defendant of his right to appeal 
his sentence was not a sufficient basis to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea 
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because the record established he did know of his right to appeal. 526 U.S. 23 (1999). 
Specifically, the record established that Mr. Peguero actually instructed his attorney to 
appeal the sentence and that he was aware of his right to do so. Though the Supreme 
Court in that case stated that actual prejudice is required, the Court also implied that if the 
record did not show defendant knew of his right to appeal the sentence, that absence 
would have been sufficient to show actual prejudice. Id. at 26. 
D. Where A Rule 11 Violation Rises To The Level Of A Constitutional 
Violation, The Plea May Be Withdrawn Whether The Case Is A Direct 
Appeal Or Post Conviction Relief. 
Petitioner next argues that the Court of Appeals was incorrect insofar as it relied 
on rules arising from direct appeal cases. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 12). Contrary to 
Petitioner's claim, these cases are not irrelevant. Id. Though some of the cases 
referenced above involve direct appeals, and many reference habeas corpus petitions, 
those relied on by Ms. Bluemel and the Court of Appeals discuss constitutional violations 
that caused a defendant's plea to be unknowing and involuntary. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 
141, HI 10-15, 134 P.3d 181 (citing Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 111, 22 P.3d 1242; Maguire, 
830 P.2d at 217 (Utah 1991); Mora, 2003 UT App 117 at f 22, 69 P.3d 838; State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah 
App. 1991)). Because the issue here is a constitutional violation rather than a procedural 
violation, all cases finding that a Rule 11 violation renders a plea unknowing or 
involuntary are relevant. 
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Petitioner argues that the "closest Bluemel comes to explaining its reasoning is a 
passing reference to State v. Stilling" which states, "noncompliance with Rule 11 
infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 13). Stilling 
draws upon the very different meaning between a technical violation and strict 
compliance. Stilling should not be read as arguing that technical violations are 
constitutional violations, or the same as failure to strictly comply. As stated above, 
courts may commit technical violations of Rule 11 without affecting the validity of the 
plea, but courts must strictly comply with Rule 11. Where noncompliance with Rule 11 
is beyond technical and results in the purpose of Rule 11 being unfulfilled, a 
constitutional violation results. 
Again, the confusion stems from the differences in terminology. A clear 
explanation of what amounts to a "technical violation," and what constitutes 
"noncompliance" or "strict compliance" would greatly clarify the present state of Rule 11 
jurisprudence. The type of violation in this case has consistently been held to be a failure 
to strictly comply with Rule 11, and therefore a constitutional violation. 
E. Bluemel Does Not Hold That Prejudice Is Presumed From Technical 
Rule 11 Violations. 
When a court fails to inform a defendant on the record of certain important 
constitutional rights, such that there is no record establishing that the plea is voluntary, 
prejudice is presumed. This rule is far different from a rule that "any technical 
'noncompliance' with the prophylactic Rule 11 requirements infringes on the 
constitutional rights of the accused,'" as Petitioner claims. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 14, 
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quoting Bluemel, at ^ 17). While this was arguably the holding of State v. Dean, 2002 
UT App 323, 57 P.3d 1106, and State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101, those 
holdings have since been reversed. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 15). Bluemel was premised on 
the more sensible holding in Mora. 
Mora is far different from subsequently overturned cases that held technical 
violations are constitutional violations. Significantly, when this Court overturned Dean 
and Hittle, the Court did not overturn Mora. It appears that this court believed that there 
was some significant difference between the Rule 11 violations in Dean and Hittle as 
compared to Mora. When comparing those cases with this case, the Bluemel panel 
correctly determined that Mora should govern. 
Dean and Hittle were cases where a trial court informed a defendant of his right to 
a jury trial, but used language slightly different from Rule 11, such as omitting the word 
"speedy." By contrast, Mora involved a situation almost exactly like this one where the 
trial court failed to incorporate the written plea statement, so the record did not 
demonstrate that the defendant knew and understood his rights. There was no evidence 
that the defendant actually read or understood the plea statement. While the language in 
Mora is borrowed from Dean, Mora remains valid law while Dean does not. When this 
Court reversed Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276, the Court did not announce that 
constitutional noncompliance with Rule 11 is only a technical violation, nor did it 
overturn Mora. 2004 UT 63 If 17-18, 95 P.3d 276. It makes far more sense that this 
Court reversed Dean because the error was technical and consisted of the omission of one 
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word, rather than failure to inform a defendant of several important rights, as was the 
case in Mora. Id. 
It is still true that "Under Utah law [courts] will presume harm . . . when a trial 
court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under Rule 11." Mora, 2003 
UT App 117 at Tj 22, 69 P.3d 838. However, the above outlined distinctions between 
technical violations and strict compliance make the rule more nuanced than Petitioner 
asserts. The trial court did not inform Ms. Bluemel anywhere on the record of her right 
to be presumed innocent, that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that her plea was an admission of all those elements, and that she had 
the right to compel attendance of defense witnesses. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at }^ 16, 
134 P.3d 181. Bluemel correctly held that where such noncompliance renders the record 
insufficient to conclude that the plea was voluntary, prejudice is presumed. Id. at f 16-
18. 
Bluemel is much different from Dean and Hittle. Those cases held that a technical 
violation is always sufficient to allow a defendant to withdraw her plea. Bluemel holds 
that a defendant must be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea where the record does not 
establish that the plea is knowing and voluntary. 
II. ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS EXIST FOR FINDING MS. 
BLUEMEL'S PLEA WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY. 
The Court granted certiorari to determine the standards for reviewing Rule 11 
violations raised for the first time in a habeas petition. Even if the Court determines that 
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the trial judge's noncompliance with Rule 11 and the incomplete record do not give rise 
to a presumption that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, other circumstances 
support a finding that Ms. BluemePs plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court of 
Appeals' opinion notes that other issues were raised, but the case was decided solely on 
the Rule 11 issue. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at \ 17, 134 P.3d 181. This section 
discusses the factual issues surrounding the voluntariness of the plea. If the Court finds 
for the State on the Rule 11 issue, it may alternatively find for Ms. Bluemel because the 
effects of various prescription medications caused the plea to be unknowing and 
involuntary. If the Court chooses not to address the factual issues at this time, this case 
should be remanded for a determination on the voluntariness of that plea based on the 
facts from this section. Ms. Bluemel would not be estopped from arguing that the Rule 
11 violations in this case result in an unknowing and involuntary plea for other reasons as 
outlined below. See e.g. State v. Robinson, 2006 UT 65 U 1, 2006 WL 3069523. 
The Constitution requires that a guilty plea be knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,111, 983 P.2d 556; Stilling, 856 P.2d at 670-71. When 
the plea is not knowingly and voluntarily entered, the defendant's due process rights have 
been violated, and the plea is unconstitutional. Id:, McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. To enter 
a knowing and voluntary plea, a defendant must be competent, which means the 
defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685 
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(1993)). A plea is not knowing and voluntary if it is the product of ignorance, 
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducement, subtle or blatant threats, or if the 
defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of [his] mental facilities." 
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 
242-43 and Brown v. PerinU 718 F.2d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 1983)). A defendant's 
competency to enter a valid plea can be detrimentally affected by medications, which can 
cause a defendant to be unable to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Godinez, 509 U.S. 
at 394 n.3, 396 n.6, 398-99. 
Courts have oftentimes found a defendant incapable of entering a knowing and 
voluntary plea when suffering from certain mental conditions or under the influence of 
medication, alcohol, or drugs. In Holland, the defendant was found incompetent to enter 
a plea when suffering from mental conditions, including depression. 921 P.2d at 434; see 
also State v. Romers, 766 P.2d 623, 628 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (defendant incompetent to 
enter knowing and voluntary plea when suffering from severe depression); Gomm, 754 
P.2d 1226 (defendant's arguments that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because 
he entered it while suffering from a mental illness, and while under the influence of 
several prescription medications which he had taken in excess of their dosage, warranted 
evidentiary hearing on the issue); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987) 
(evidentiary hearing warranted by defendant's arguments that his plea was involuntary 
and unknowing because he was under the influence of medication when the plea was 
entered). Because a defendant may be under the influence of something which affects his 
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea, courts often directly ask the defendant or 
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his counsel whether he is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. State v. 
Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338 at U 10, 100 P.3d 267 (court is not ordinarily required to 
inquire beyond a defendant's denial of drug or alcohol use, but such a duty to make 
additional inquiries may arise if the court becomes aware that the defendant may be 
impaired); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (meaningful plea 
colloquy when the trial court verified with the defendant that he could read, write, and 
understand English, was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, was not mentally ill, 
understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, understood the 
penalties, and was satisfied with his attorney's advice.); State v. Cameron, 704 P.2d 
1355, 1358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court could not judge a defendant's competency 
to waive a jury based solely on the colloquy in which the defendant merely answered 
"yes" or "no" to questions posed by the trial court); Holland, 921 P.2d at 435 (same). 
In United States v. Damon, the defendant informed the trial court during the plea 
colloquy that he was under the influence of prescription medication, but the trial court 
failed to further question the defendant about the medication or its effects upon the 
defendant. 191 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1999). Instead, the court accepted the guilty pleas, and 
the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had a duty to "follow up on the drug 
ingestion issue in order to determine whether he was competent to plead." Id. at 564. 
The appeals court agreed, finding that the court should have broadened its inquiry to 
satisfy itself that the plea was being made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 565. The 
trial court erred in failing to conduct a further inquiry into the defendant's mental state as 
a result of his medication use, and the case was remanded for a determination of whether 
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the medication taken by the defendant, based on objective data about its nature and effect, 
had the capability to sufficiently affect the defendant's mental faculties such to render 
him incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Id. The trial court had a clear obligation to 
ensure that a defendant's drug use did not effect his ability to enter a voluntary and 
knowing plea. Id.; see also United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3rd Cir. 1987) 
(where court is informed that the defendant has recently ingested drugs or other 
substances capable of impairing his ability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
his constitutional rights, the state court has an obligation to inquire further into the 
defendant's competence); United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 595-96 (1st Cir. 
1991) (the court had reason to suspect that the medications taken by the accused might 
impinge upon the defendant's capacity to enter a voluntary and intelligent plea, but failed 
to inquire what dosages the defendant had taken and what effects, if any, the medications 
would have on the defendant's clear-headedness); Godinez, 509 U.S. at 426-27 
(Blackmun, J. Dissenting) (recognizing that medication can affect one's mental 
competence and once trial court was aware of defendant's prescription drug use, it should 
have conducted a further inquiry into his competence to waive his constitutional rights). 
Conversely, in Benvenuto, the court found that a defendant had entered a knowing 
and voluntary plea where, upon inquiry, both the defendant and his counsel informed the 
court that there were no competency issues. 1999 UT 60 at ^ 11, 983 P.2d 556. There, 
the defendant was charged with aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder and 
two counts of aggravated robbery, but was offered a plea in which the aggravated robbery 
counts were dismissed. Id, Upon his arrest, he was placed on suicide watch at the county 
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jail, and was appointed several attorneys who had extensive experience representing 
clients who had mental health problems or whose competence to enter a plea was 
questionable. Id. at ][ 3-4. Defense counsel inquired into defendant's competence and the 
defendant was interviewed and examined by a forensic psychologist. Id. at f 5. These 
examiners found the defendant to be depressed, but capable of entering a knowing and 
voluntary plea. Id. At the plea hearing, the court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, and 
asked defense counsel if defendant was offering a voluntary and knowing plea. Id. 
Defense counsel disclosed that the defendant had some mental health issues, but was an 
intelligent young man and was capable of understanding the proceedings. Id. The court 
then asked the defendant if he was being treated for any medical or mental conditions, to 
which the defendant answered he was not. Id. at Tf 8. The defendant later moved to 
withdraw his plea on the grounds that he was confused and depressed when he entered it, 
and therefore that the plea was not truly voluntary. Id. at \ 9, 12. The trial court denied 
the motion and the defendant appealed. Id. at f 9. On review the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court's rulings, finding that the defendant's attorneys had been 
"scrupulously attentive to [his] mental condition" and had reasonably inquired into his 
mental state by having him examined by mental health professionals and conveyed their 
knowledge of his competency at the hearing. Id. at ^ f 14, 19-20. Further, the defendant's 
own actions, demeanor, and statements at the plea supported finding of a voluntary plea. 
Id. at \ 21. The Supreme Court then affirmed the trial court ruling, holding that the plea 
was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at ^ | 23. 
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Similarly, in State v. Manning, the defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief, 
claiming her right to appeal had been denied. 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, affirmed on 
other grounds, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. In reviewing her claim, the court found at the 
plea hearing the defendant entered knowing and voluntary pleas and knowingly and 
voluntarily waived her rights, referencing defense counsel's assertions that defendant was 
a "bright lady" who was educated through the 15 grade, and that she had participated in 
preparing her written plea statement. Id. at f^ 4. Further, the defendant spoke directly to 
the court, stating that defense counsel had adequately and properly served her, and she 
was satisfied with his service. Id. Because the defendant was adequately informed of her 
rights, and it was later shown that she did not request that an appeal be filed, her petition 
was denied. Id. at f^ 29, 33-35. 
In this case, unlike the defendants in Manning and Benvenuto, Ms. Bluemel was 
not capable of entering knowing and voluntary pleas because of her medicated and 
impaired mental state at the plea hearing. At the time she entered her plea, she was under 
a doctor's care and was taking the following prescription medications for a litany of 
maladies: 
• 600 mg of Neurotin three times daily (1800 mg per day) 
• 150 mg of Effexor twice daily (300 mg per day) 
• 5 mg Xanax daily 
• 50 mg Trazadone daily 
• 700 mg of Soma four times daily (2800 mg daily) 
• 800 mg of Ibuprofen three times daily (2400 mg daily) 
• Macrodantin; and 
• Axid 
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(Civil R. 113-114, 121). The purpose of these medications was as follows: Neurotin for 
mood stabilization, Effexor for depression, Xanax for panic attacks, Trazadone as a 
sleeping aid, Ibuprofen for menstrual cramping, Macodantin for post-intercourse pain and 
to prevent urinary tract infections, Axid for ulcers and heartburn, and Soma for muscle 
tension and migraine prevention. (Civil R. 113). As testified to in the affidavit of 
pharmacology and toxicology professor Doug E. Rollins, this culmination of medications 
at the indicated dosages would likely cause a significant decrease in Ms. Bluemel's 
cognitive functioning, and her cognitive abilities would be significantly impaired. (Civil 
R. 109-110). This combination of medications severely limited Appellee's ability to 
consult with her trial counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and to 
understand the proceedings, and thus rendered her unable to enter and knowing and 
voluntary plea. 
Further, the court did nothing to discern whether Ms. Bluemel was able to enter a 
knowing and voluntary plea. Beyond the omissions in the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the trial 
court never inquired from either Ms. Bluemel or trial counsel as to whether Ms. Bluemel 
was under the influence of anything, had any mental or emotional conditions affecting 
her mental capacity, or was capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. Unlike the 
trial courts in Beckstead and Penman who undertook to adequately ensure that the 
defendant could enter a knowing and voluntary plea, this trial court did nothing of the 
sort. Rather, like the trial courts in Holland and Cameron that were reversed and 
remanded, the trial court attempted to judge the defendant's competency and ability to 
enter a valid plea based merely on a few yes or no questions. The trial court's failure to 
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inquire left hidden that Ms. Bluemel was under the influence of multiple prescription 
medications that adversely impaired her mental state and made her unable to enter a 
knowing and voluntary plea. Undoubtedly, had Judge Burningham been warned that Ms. 
Bluemel was on eight prescription medications at the time, including psychotropic mood 
stabilizing drugs, he would not have accepted her plea without further inquiry. See 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 983 P.2d 556. 
Additionally, the review of the video shows that Ms. Bluemel did not appear 
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. During the entire proceeding, she is 
distracted and fidgety. (Civil R. 146). She repeatedly shifts her gaze around the 
courtroom and does not focus solely on the judge. Id. Her demeanor is clearly 
inconsistent with that of a defendant who is entering a plea to three first degree felony 
charges with minimum mandatory sentences. The amount of medication she was under, 
the trial court's failure to inquire of her mental capacity, and Ms. Bluemel's demeanor 
during the hearing, all evince that she was unable to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Nothing to the contrary appears. 
Ms. Bluemel's multiple prescription medications significantly affected her 
cognitive abilities. Because the court did not ensure that appellant was able to enter a 
knowing and voluntary plea, the plea was taken in violation of the Constitution. Under 
such circumstances, the interests of justice outweigh the untimely filing of Respondent's 
petition. The State's petition should be denied. 
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III. WHERE MS. BLUEMEL'S PLEA WAS UNKNOWING AND 
INVOLUNTARY, THIS CLAIM IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act, a defendant may petition for post-
conviction relief, such as a vacation or modification of an original conviction or sentence, 
on such grounds that "the conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States 
Constitution . . . [or] the Utah Constitution . . . [or] the petitioner had ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution^]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104. The Act was meant to be a "substantive 
legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
102. In assessing whether a final conviction would be reviewed, a judgment is usually 
final and not subject to attack, except in unusual circumstances. Jackson v. Friel, 2004 
UT App 155, 2004 WL 1368269 (unpublished decision) (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001 
UT 96, ^ f 15, 44 P.3d 626). Unusual circumstances are demonstrated by showing that 
"there was an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional 
right." Id. When an obvious injustice or denial of constitutional rights has occurred, a 
post conviction petition may be used to attack the judgment of conviction. Gomm v. 
Cook, 754 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Pursuant to the statute, such a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed 
within one year after the cause of action has accrued. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. A 
cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
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(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari 
is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petition knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
U.C.A. § 78-3 5a-107(2). However, an untimely filing may be excused if the court finds 
that "the interests of justice require." U.C.A. § 78-35a-107(2). While Utah courts have 
declined to provide a specific definition of "interests of justice," several cases have 
addressed whether sufficient interests of justice require waiving an untimely filing. 
In Julian v. State, an inmate filed for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay 
testimony without first assessing its reliability, and that both trial and appellate counsel 
were ineffective. 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998). The State argued that the untimely filing 
should bar review of the petition, and that the "interests of justice" exception was to be 
applied narrowly in only truly exception circumstances. Id. at 254. The State further 
argued that the statute of limitations under Section 78-35a-107 meant to encourage 
litigants to research and bring their claims early to promote finality, and that the State had 
an interest in keeping convicted persons incarcerated, and late claims made it "difficult, if 
not impossible,... to defend against those claims." Id. While the Court appreciated the 
State's arguments, it was not persuaded, stating that "if the proper showing is made [that 
the petitioner has been wrongfully incarcerated], the mere passage of time can never 
justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights, 
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regardless of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute that individual." Id. 
(emphasis in original). The Court went on to say that "meritorious claims raised in a 
habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of justice." Id. The Court then 
found that the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the interests of 
justice—the gravity of petitioner's claims—excused his untimely filing. Id. at 258. 
While this case dealt with a petition for habeas corpus, the Court specifically addressed 
the one-year filing deadline in the Post Conviction Remedies Act. 
Additionally, in Currier v. Holden, the Court excused an untimely filing where the 
defendant was moved to a rural jail and had trouble meeting with attorneys. Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In McClellan v. Holden, the court 
excused an untimely filing where the defendant had two attorneys withdraw from his 
case, had difficulty contacting a new attorney, and the trial transcript was misplaced. 862 
P.2d 1357, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Conversely, a five-year delay and lack of 
evidence justifying a waiver did not excuse on untimely filing in Oliver v. State, 2004 UT 
App 360 (unpublished decision). Also, the court found no reason to excuse the untimely 
filing where a defendant dumped the facts of the case on the court with no research or 
legal argument, Bairdv, Galetka, 2003 UT App 250 (unpublished decision), or where the 
defendant's claims were frivolous and had already been raised and rejected. Reddish v. 
Galteka, 2000 UT App 328 (unpublished decision). 
In looking at the "interests of justice" exception to a time deadline, other states 
have discussed several factors that may be considered in a court's decision. In State v. 
Goodwin, the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the untimely filing of a petition 
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for post-conviction relief 803 A.2d 102 (N.J. 2002). The New Jersey post-conviction 
relief statute states that a "court may relax the time bar if the defendant alleges facts 
demonstrating that the delay was due to the defendant's excusable neglect or if the 
interests of justice' demand it." Id. at 109. There the Court stated that in determining 
whether a defendant had put forth sufficient evidence to relax the time bar in the interests 
of justice, the court should "consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to 
the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claims[.]" Id. After applying these 
factors however, the petition was found to be time-barred because the defendant failed to 
adequately explain the nearly three-year delay. Id. at 113. 
In this case, Ms. Bluemel readily admits that her Petition was untimely filed. She 
was sentenced on March 27, 2002 and had thirty days to appeal or move to withdraw her 
pleas, which deadline occurred on April 26, 2002. Although she repeatedly expressed the 
desire to do so to her counsel, no such motion was made. Accordingly her cause of 
action accrued April 26, 2002, and she had until April 26, 2003 to file a petition for post-
conviction relief. Her petition was not filed until May 3, 2004, one year and seven days 
after the deadline. The cause for most of this delay was trial counsel's continued 
misrepresentation to his client that he was taking care of her case, when in fact he was not 
doing anything with the case. Once Ms. Bluemel finally realized she was not receiving 
assistance, the deadline for filing her petition had passed. She then was faced with the 
task of retaining new counsel while incarcerated, much like the defendant in McClellan. 
It is notable that during this entire period, Ms. Bluemel was incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison. It goes without saying that an inmate's ability to locate, retain, and meet with 
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counsel is significantly more difficult than one who is not incarcerated. While it is true 
that Ms. Bluemel did not seek counsel for a time, this failure was based on her trial 
counsel's repeated representations that he was actively working on her appeal. (Civil R. 
112-13). 
Additionally, any prejudice to the State is minimal, if present at all. The State 
argued that "[cjollateral attacks on legitimate convictions many years later make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the State to defend against those claims. Witnesses may 
have moved, died, or otherwise forgotten the events in question. Important evidence may 
have also been destroyed." (Civil R. 78). Additionally, in its Order granting the State's 
Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the victim could be harmed by reopening the 
case. (Civil R. 132). Specifically, the trial court noted that the "emotional trauma of the 
crime can often be more significant than the physical impact" and that "[allowing a tardy 
challenge which could result in the prosecution beginning anew can create tremendous 
hardship and difficulty for all witnesses." (Civil R. 132). 
Ms. Bluemel concedes that victims need not be drug through numerous court 
proceedings if unnecessary, but also contends that granting the post conviction petition 
will not further emotionally scar the victim. As the case ended in a plea the victim has 
never testified. Further the victim was not a young child who could be traumatized 
merely by new court proceedings, but rather a male adolescent who has now reached the 
age of majority. (Crim. R. 57:4). 
While the State does have a legitimate interest in limiting challenges to 
convictions, this interest cannot and does not trump a defendant's interest in having his 
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constitutional rights protected. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected this argument 
outright. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. ("[T]he mere passage of time can never justify 
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights, regardless 
of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute the individual.") (emphasis in 
original). Further the one-year delay in filing should not be prejudicial to the State 
because the State should still have the file and any evidence, including statements from 
the victim that prompted the plea initially, and no showing has been made that any 
witnesses have died or moved, or that the events underscoring this case would easily be 
forgotten. Thus, although the State would be forced to reprosecute the case, it is not 
unduly prejudicial to require it to do such when constitional rights were clearly violated. 
Under Goodwin, by entering an unknowing and involuntary plea, Ms. Bluemel has 
received a substantial injustice, requiring a relaxing of the time requirements. Ms. 
BluemePs plea was unknowing and involuntary, both because she was under the 
influence of several mind-altering prescription medications and because the court failed 
to establish that she understood the rights she waived by entering a guilty plea. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea unknowing 
and involuntary. Though the Supreme Court may examine the entire record, nothing in 
the trial record indicates that Ms. Bluemel understood all of the rights she was waiving. 
Even if the record did contain sufficient facts to render the plea constitutional, Ms. 
Bluemel was under the influence of several prescriptions and over the counter 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 renders the guilty plea unknowing 
and involuntary. Though the Supreme Court may examine the entire record, nothing in 
the trial record indicates that Ms. Bluemel understood all of the rights she was waiving. 
Even if the record did contain sufficient facts to render the plea constitutional, Ms. 
Bluemel was under the influence of several prescriptions and over the counter 
medications that influenced her at the time of the guilty plea. Because of the combination 
of these factors, the interests of justice require that Ms. Bluemel be permitted to withdraw 
her plea even though her petition was filed after the one year deadline. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of December, 2006. 
SKORDAS, (ZWSTON & HYDE 
Gregory C. Skordas 
RefaXca C.Hyde 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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pleas, and 
£2} defendant's failure to timely file her petition for post-conviction relief fell within interests-of-justice exception under 
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Before BENCH. P.J., McHUGH and ORME. JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH. Presiding Judge: 
K 1 Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court concluded that the 
petition was untimely filed and did not constitute an interests-of-justice exception under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act (PCRA). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp.2005). We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 Between October 1998 and April 1999, Bluemel allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her fourteen-year-old 
foster son on several occasions and, in one instance, gave him alcohol. Bluemel was charged with seven counts of rape, 
all first degree felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (2003). and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor, a class 
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A misdemeanor, see Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003). 
\ 3 With the assistance of her trial counsel, Bluemel negotiated a plea agreement, which was reduced to writing as a plea 
statement. The plea statement indicated that Bluemel agreed to plead guilty to three counts of rape and one count of 
supplying alcohol to a minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the other four counts of rape. The plea statement 
referenced the consequences of entering a guilty plea and discussed basic constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury 
trial, the right to presumption of innocence, and the State's burden of proof. The plea statement also declared that 
Bluemel waived these constitutional rights and that she voluntarily entered her pleas. Further, the plea statement 
indicated that Bluemel read and understood the plea statement, that she *184 was "not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants," and that she "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed]" her pleas. 
Tf 4 During her arraignment, the trial court E^l informed Bluemel that "[bjefore I can accept your pleas, you have certain 
[constitutional [r]ights that you need to waive. They are talked about in that statement in advance of plea. Do you have 
any questions about the statement?" Bluemel indicated that she did not have any questions about the plea statement. The 
trial court went on to ask Bluemel if she understood her constitutional rights and that she would be waiving them. 
Bluemel responded affirmatively. The trial court then informed Bluemel "that if you wish to withdraw these pleas you 
need to make a motion in writing to do that within [thirty] days of sentencing" and that the court "would not 
automatically grant that motion." Bluemel acknowledged that she understood. The trial court then stated, "[s]o if you do 
intend to plea, then let's have you sign the [plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial judge all 
signed the plea statement. Bluemel then verbally entered on the record her guilty pleas to three counts of rape and one 
count of supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial court accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel ha[d] knowingly and 
voluntarily entered her pleas." 
FN1. Judge Guy R. Burningham, who has since retired, presided over Bluemel's arraignment in 2001. Later, in 
2005, Judge James R. Taylor presided over and dismissed Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief. For 
ease of reference, we refer to both judges as "the trial court." 
If 5 On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was sentenced to three indeterminate terms of not less than five years to life and one 
indeterminate term not to exceed one year, all of which would run concurrently. Bluemel was immediately taken into 
custody and remains incarcerated. 
K 6 Immediately following her sentencing, Bluemel allegedly informed her trial counsel that she wanted to appeal. Her 
trial counsel allegedly advised Bluemel that he would handle her appeal and informed her that she had one year to file 
her appeal. During her first year in prison, her trial counsel allegedly visited her three times and continually informed her 
that he was still working on her appeal. Bluemel later attempted to contact her trial counsel concerning the status of her 
appeal, but he refused to respond to her communications. After one year, Bluemel sought other legal counsel and hired 
her current counsel in October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel and reviewing the matter, her current counsel filed the 
petition on May 3, 2004, over two years after her sentencing date. The State moved for dismissal of the petition because 
it was untimely and did not qualify under the interests-of-justice exception. The trial court dismissed Bluemel's petition 
and now she appeals the dismissal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
£11 % 7 Bluemel argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief as untimely because 
her circumstances come within the interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. 
Bluemel asserts that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and received ineffective assistance of counsel, either 
of which warrants post-conviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is reviewed " 'for correctness 
without deference to the [trial] court's conclusions of law.' " Gardner v. Galetka. 2004 UT 42.H 7. 94 P.3d 263 (quoting 
Rudolph v. Galetka. 2002 UT 7.114. 43 P.3d 467). 
ANALYSIS 
f 8 "[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to 'establishf ] a substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a 
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conviction or sentence for a criminal offense.' " Id at If 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-102(1) (2002)). Under the PCRA, a person may file a petition for post-conviction relief within one year after "the 
last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing may be excused "[i]f the court finds that the *185 interests of justice [so] 
require." Id § 78-35a-107(3). 
U 9 Bluemel argues that her circumstances in this matter fit within the PCRA's interests-of-justice exception, and that 
her petition should not have been dismissed. Bluemel claims the exception should be recognized here because (1) she 
did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas and (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the course of 
the trial court proceedings. In support of her claim that she did not enter knowing and voluntary pleas, Bluemel argues 
that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R Crim. P. 
JJFN2 
FN2. Because our decision that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11 by failing to inform Bluemel 
of certain constitutional rights is dispositive, we need not address her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
nor Bluemel's argument concerning the influence of prescription medications, which allegedly prevented her 
from sufficiently understanding her plea. 
I21I3JI41I5JI6] K 10 "The procedures for entering a guilty plea are set forth in rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." State v Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60^ 11. 983 P.2d 556: see also Utah R.Crim. P. 11. "The plea-taking 
proceedings [in rule 111 are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty knowingly and voluntarily waives the 
protections the constitution guarantees him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v Stilling. 856 P.2d 666. 671 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). "A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made in order to protect a defendant's due process 
rights." Id_ "It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm ... when a trial court fails to inform a 
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11." State v Mora. 2003 UT App 117.H 22. 69 P.3d 838 (omission in 
original) (citation and quotations omitted). "We presume harm because, by not knowing which rights a defendant is 
waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." Id_ (citation and quotations omitted). "If the defendant 
is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an 
involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice." ld_ (citation and quotations omitted). 
I21IS1 11 11 Under Utah law, the trial court bears the burden of ensuring strict compliance with rule 11. See State v 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309. 1312-13 (Utah 1987). appeal after remand on other grounds, 779 P 2d 1133 (Utah 1989). 
"This means 'that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.' " State v 
Visser. 2000 UT 88.1f 11. 22 P 3d 1242 (alteration in original) (quoting State v Abevta. 852 P.2d 993. 995 (Utah 1993)). 
Although the trial court has "a duty of 'strict' compliance" with rule 11. strict compliance "does not mandate a particular 
script or rote recitation of the rights listed." ld_ In Visser. the Utah Supreme Court "reemphasize [d] that the substantive 
goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their 
decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined by formalistic ritual." IcL 
K 12 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights and factors of which the trial court must inform the defendant. .See Utah 
RCrim P. 11(e). These include, among other things, that the plea is voluntary, the right to presumption of innocence, 
the right to counsel, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial before a jury, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and that the defendant waives these rights. See id Rule 11(e) also requires that 
the "defendant understand[ ] the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements." Id 
[91 [ 10] f 13 In determining whether a defendant is informed of his or her rights, properly understands them, and 
voluntarily waives them, the trial court must engage in a plea colloquy with the defendant. See id Rule 11 provides two 
avenues whereby the trial court may properly engage in a plea colloquy. The trial court may (1) verbally *186 question 
the defendant on the record regarding each of the factors and rights described in rule 11(e) or (2) receive a written plea 
statement from the defendant regarding each of the rights and factors. See id The plea statement is "used to promote 
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efficiency during a plea colloquy." Mora. 2003 UT App 117 at f 19. 69 P.3d 838. "However, [a plea statement] should 
be only the starting point, not an end point, in the pleading process." IcL (citation and quotations omitted). "It is critical 
... that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty ... plea is entered. Therefore, if [a 
plea statement] is used to aid [r]ule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing." A£ (first omission, 
and first and third alterations in original) (citations and quotations omitted). 
[Ill U 14 "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the [plea statement] and 
voluntarily signed it." Id_ (citation and quotations omitted); see also State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216. 217 (Utah 1991) 
(holding a plea statement is "properly incorporated in the record" when "the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy 
that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein"), appeal after 
remand, 924 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct.App.1996). rev'd on other grounds, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At that time, "omissions 
or ambiguities in the [statement] must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course 
of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Thus, "the efficiency-promoting function 
of the [plea statement] is thereby served, in that the court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11 inquiries that are clearly 
posed and answered in the [statement], unless rule 11 by its terms specifically requires such repetition." Id. 
[121[13"| % 15 In this case, the plea statement was not properly incorporated into the record. During the plea colloquy 
concerning her statement, the trial court asked Bluemel only if she had "any questions about the statement." Bluemel 
responded that she did not and was directed by the trial court to sign the statement. However, the trial court never asked 
Bluemel if she actually read, understood, and acknowledged her plea statement. See Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217. Nor did 
the trial court make any other similar inquiry. We conclude that this was a critical error. As a result, "the [statement] 
was hot properly incorporated into the record, and we may not consider it when determining whether the record 
establishes that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11." State v. Mora. 2003 UT App 117^ 20. 69 P.3d 838. 
[141 TI 16 In reviewing the plea colloquy (exclusive of the plea statement) in this matter, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of all of the rule 11(e) factors and rights. See Utah R.Crim. P. 11 (e). Specifically, the trial court failed to inform 
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of innocence," that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all those elements," and that she had the "right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses." Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)(3). (4VA). As a result, the trial court erred by not fully 
complying with rule 11 in this matter. 
[15] K 17 Additionally, because noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused, see 
State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666. 671 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), we conclude that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls 
within the interests-of-justice exception under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3). As a result, the trial 
court erred by dismissing Bluemel's petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
f 18 We conclude that the plea statement was not properly incorporated into the record and that the trial court did not 
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with Bluemel. As a result, Bluemel's circumstances qualified under the interests-
of-justice exception to the PCRA and the trial court erred by dismissing her petition. We therefore reverse and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
*187 f 19 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH and GREGORY K. ORME. Judges. 
Utah App.,2006. 
Bluemel v. State 
134 P.3d 181,549 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2006 UT App 141 
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Addendum B 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. Vl-Jury Trials 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
ANNOTATED 
AMENDMENT VI-JURY TRIAL FOR CRIMES, AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
-•Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Current through P.L. 109-394 (excluding P.L. 109-390)-approved 12-14-06 
Copr. © 2006 Thomson/West. No. Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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UT CONST Art. 1, § 12 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
-•Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or 
rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
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UT ST § 78-2a-3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF APPEALS 
-•§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board 
of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by 
the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1: 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except 
petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.asDX?desti^ " p 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
-4§ 78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has 
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as 
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement 
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence 
for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
-•§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the 
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked 
in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at 
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the 
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was 
known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court 
of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by 
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
veb2.westlaw.com/prJnt/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s ..=2.0&prid=A0055800000017040005501443BFE05350671AB940&rs=WLW6.11 Page 1 of 2 
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
^/web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?destination=atp&s...=2.0&prid=A0055800000017040005501443BFE05350671AB940&rs=WLW6.11 Page 2 of 2 
V\fesfckw 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
•+§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of 
the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the 
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition 
for writ of certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may 
excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations 
period established in this section. 
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation 
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V\fe&law: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VIII. PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 
-•RULE 65B. EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
(a) Availability of Remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any 
of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for 
instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this 
rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for 
extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in 
these rules. 
(b) Wrongful Restraints on Personal Liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this 
paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with 
the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or 
the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the Petition and Attachments. The petition shall contain a 
short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks 
relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is 
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by 
the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has 
already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition any legal process available to the petitioner that resulted in 
restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the 
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the 
legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of Frivolous Claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the 
petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an 
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order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and 
the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. 
(6) Responsive Pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous 
on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of 
the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the 
same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or 
otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the 
respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue 
an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on 
the legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly 
whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been 
restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to any other 
person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, 
and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall 
be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a 
dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary Relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained 
will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury 
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue 
a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be 
dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the 
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of 
such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative Service of the Hearing Order. If the respondent cannot be 
found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process 
issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in the manner 
and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the 
action. 
(9) Avoidance of Service by Respondent. If anyone having custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts 
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff 
shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith 
bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or Other Proceedings. In the event that the court orders a 
hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render 
judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall 
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for 
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring 
before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the 
right to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order 
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form 
or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to 
impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful Use of or Failure to Exercise Public Authority. 
(1) Who May Petition the Court; Security. The attorney general may, and when 
^web2.westlawxom/Drint/Drintstream.asDX?destination=atD&s...=2.0&Drid=A0055800000020790005501443BFE053A853D2EA83&rs=WLW6.11 Paqe 2 of 4 
directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the 
grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required to be 
represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one 
of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the 
court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a 
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A 
petition filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph 
shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be 
accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for 
in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, 
whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created 
by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or 
permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons 
act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; 
(D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating 
to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any 
corporation has forfeited or misused its corporcite rights, privileges or 
franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful Use of Judicial Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty; Actions 
by Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(1) Who May Petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by 
any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an 
act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the 
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is 
entitled; or (D) where the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by constitutional or 
statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to 
the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
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(4) Scope of Review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
2006 
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V\fesflaw 
UT R RCRP Rule 11 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
-•RULE 11. PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if 
a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
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(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these 
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of 
a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the 
court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall 
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. §77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this 
rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
Current with amendments effective November 1,2006 
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Wstlaw; 
Rules A p p . P r o c , Rule 11 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
-•RULE 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits 
filed in the trial court, including the presentence report in criminal matters, 
the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the 
trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all 
cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to 
conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on 
appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be 
transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with 
collation in the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the 
collated index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page 
only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series 
of numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the 
clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the 
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the 
bottom right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the 
cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each 
volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential 
number beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of 
the original record. 
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(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index 
shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or 
transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on 
which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and 
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties 
in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for 
writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with 
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other 
action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included 
by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua 
sponte motion or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include 
all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua 
sponte motion or motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in the 
agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to 
appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing 
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state 
that the transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same 
period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk 
of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed 
format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within the 
request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be 
requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to 
that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the 
appellate court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to 
correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript. 
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire 
transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing 
the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on 
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appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and 
a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of 
the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the 
service of the request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file 
and serve on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. 
Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has 
requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within 
the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the trial court for 
an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal 
as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a 
statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and 
were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts 
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the 
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with 
such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the 
issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial 
court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate 
court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the 
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best 
available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the 
appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after 
service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be 
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to 
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, 
the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if 
necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the 
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any 
party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to 
the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
Current with amendments effective November 1, 
2006 
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